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We generate a longitudinal dataset using the rotating panel component of the nationally 
representative Labour Force Surveys from 2001 to 2003. We then estimate the transition 
probabilities across different labour market states over a six month period. We find that 
unemployed searchers are more likely to find employment than the non-searching 
unemployed. Informal sector workers are more likely to find formal sector employment than 
the searching unemployed. Whites are more likely to find and remain in formal sector jobs. 
However, some part of the Black – White unemployment gap arises from unemployed Whites 
leaving the labour force at a higher rate.  
 
. 
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South Africa has a chronically high unemployment problem. This has been observed in 
several cross-sectional surveys starting with the PSLSD/SALDRU survey conducted in 1993. 
Much research has been devoted to understanding various dimensions of employment and 
unemployment. However, a lack of longitudinal data has prevented researchers from 
estimating flows from unemployment into employment and from unemployment to 
withdrawal from the labour force. Not knowing how much turnover there is in the labour 
market makes it difficult to identify whether there is a core set of people who never work (the 
unemployable) or whether a high proportion of workers experience short spells of 
unemployment. Questions about the effectiveness of search behaviors are also difficult to 
answer without observations on the same person over time. These are simple questions of 
fundamental importance in understanding the dynamics of the South African labour market. 
 
At present, there are two geographically focused longitudinal datasets in the public domain. 
The Kwa-Zulu Natal Income Dynamics Study (KIDS) followed SALDRU respondents and 
re-interviewed them in 1998 and 2004. KIDS has been extensively used to analyse dynamic 
labour market movements. There are three limitations to these data. First, the focus on Kwa-
Zulu Natal limits generalisability of findings. Second, sample sizes are small, which restricts 
statistical power and reduces the precision of corresponding estimates. Third, a five year gap 
between waves may be desirable for studying income mobility over a significant period of 
time but is not ideal for studying the rate at which people find jobs. It is possible that a person 
could have several spells of employment and unemployment over a five year period which 
would not be captured in a five year long difference.  
 
The second panel data set is the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS): a survey of young adults 
living in Cape Town, Western Cape. Data are available on a sample of youth initially aged 14 
to 22 for waves conducted in 2002 and 2004. These data are also limited in geographic 
generalisability. They do contain much more information on work and labour market 
transitions between waves than the KIDS since retrospective job histories are collected from 
the young aduts. These data would be appropriate for analysing labour market dynamics 
among young people; however, we would not be able to learn more about these dynamics for 
all adults since the oldest CAPS respondents are now 26 years of age.  
 
In this paper, we aim to describe labour market transitions for a sample of adults (ages 15-58) 
drawn from across South Africa. We present one way in which the rotating panel component 
of the Labour Force Surveys (LFS) between September 2001 and September 2003 can be 
matched to help us in this descriptive task. To the best of our knowledge, no researcher has 
used this version of the data. For this reason, we carefully explain the matching algorithm 
that creates the panel and discuss some challenges of this procedure.  
 
Our data complement the recently released Statistics South Africa individual level panel, 
which also draws on multiple waves of the LFS. While the official release (based on name 
matches) almost surely has fewer false matches, these data have been stripped of household 
identifiers. This seriously limits the types of analyses the data can be used for, as no 
information about other household residents is linked to the individual. Questions about 
spousal effects and home production, the effects of pension income on schooling and labor 
supply, or even simple aggregations of household income for per capita poverty 
classifications are unanswerable with the Statistics South Africa panel. With our panel, such 3 
 
household level variables can be constructed, allowing researchers to analyses different sorts 
of questions.  
 
We begin this paper by describing how we created the matched panel, and then present 
transition matrices that document the rates at which people in various labour market states 
transit into other states. As a robustness check on the validity of the panel, we check whether 
the transition rates are consistent with the change in the levels of employment and 
unemployment that are observed across individual waves. Specifically, we compare sample 
proportions in each labour market state in wave t+1 to estimated proportions in each labour 
market state in that wave. The estimated proportions are the panel transition rates multiplied 
by the initial labour market stock variable in the full wave t cross section. On average across 
the four panels, our predictions are less than 1% point away from the full cross-sectional 
estimates in wave t+1 in each of the five labour market states that we use. This provides us 
with some confidence in the matching algorithm.  
 
We generate transition rates for demographic groups defined by race, age and gender. We 
find Africans and African females in particular are more likely to lose employment over a 6 
month period and much less likely to find employment. Gender and race differences in labour 
market transition rates are large. The chances of finding or maintaining employment are 
particularly low amongst African youth. Interestingly, we find that transitions from informal 
to formal sector jobs are almost uniformly higher across all groups than transitions into 
formal jobs from other labour market states. 
 
2. Prior work on labour market flows 
 
Information using cross-sectional data has been used extensively to show how demographic 
factors such as education, gender, race and location correlate with employment and 
unemployment (see Bhorat et al (2001), Kingdon and Knight (2001a) and Klasen and 
Woolard (1999)) Youth unemployment is growing (Casale, Muller & Posel (2004)), racial 
differences in employment rates remain significant, (Rospabe (1999), Brookes and Hinks 
(2004), and Kingdon and Knight (2004)) and gender differences in participation and 
employment have become increasingly relevant over time (Casale and Posel (2002) and Grun 
(2004)). Our research helps us to better understand all of these many aspects of the South 
African labour market. 
 
Only a few studies have explicitly considered modeling labour force dynamics. Wittenberg 
(2002) does so using non-parametric techniques and cross-sectional data. However, most of 
our knowledge of employment and poverty dynamics comes from the KIDS survey, which is 
described in May et al (2000). Keswell (2000) analyses earnings mobility and employment 
transitions, using the KIDS dataset. Dinkelman (2004) uses a search framework to investigate 
the effects of household context on the efficacy of search. Cichello et al (2005) provide a 
thorough analysis of earnings and employment dynamics using KIDS.  
 
3. The Data 
 
The core data come from repeated waves of the South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS) 
released by Statistics South Africa. These are biannual, nationally representative surveys, 
conducted in March and September each year. Between September 2001 and September 4 
 
2003, (i.e. LFS2001:2 to LFS2003:2), 20% of dwellings were out-rotated from each wave
3 
and the sample was refreshed with a new 20% of dwellings. We use these repeat observations 
to construct a panel. For the rest of the paper, wave 4 is the LFS conducted in September 
2001, wave 5 was conducted in March 2002, wave 6 in September 2002, wave 7 in March 
2003 and wave 8 in September 2003.   
 
Year Month Wave
2001 September Wave 4
2002 March Wave 5
2002 September Wave 6
2003 March Wave 7
2003 September Wave 8
Table 1: Year and Month of Labour Force Survey waves
 
 
Matching observations across waves is not straightforward. Difficulties arise due to out-
migration, mortality, in-migration of household members, and the fact that the person 
identifiers within households are not maintained across waves. Thus, person i in household j 
in wave t is not necessarily the same person as person i in household j in wave t+1. This 
problem is similar to the one that researchers have experienced in the US when trying to 
extract longitudinal data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Some insights and 
suggestions on various matching alternatives are discussed in Madrian and Lefgren (1999). 
Following their discussion, we matched people with the same dwelling identifier across 
waves, based on their demographic characteristics and reports about whether they had 
recently taken up residence in a particular dwelling. Since no researcher in South Africa have 
yet published any findings using this dataset, we carefully document our matching procedure, 
describe the final panels that we generate, and discuss some of the potential pitfalls in 
employing such a methodology. 
 
3.1 The matching algorithm 
 
Step 1: First match each wave t with wave t+1 using only the household identifiers, where t= 
4, 5, 6 or 7.  
Step 2: Exclude all households present in wave t but not in wave t+1, (or vice versa), as it is 
impossible to match these observations across waves. This excludes all respondents in 
dwellings rotated out of the sample from wave t or introduced into the sample in wave 
t+1. 
4 
Step 3: Exclude all individual level observations in wave t+1 where the respondent is 
reported to have moved into the residence in the past 6 months. This should exclude 
people who moved into the dwelling between wave t and wave t+1. 
Step 4: Exclude individuals in a particular wave where multiple observations in a household 
have the same race, gender and ages differing by at most one year. For example, if 
there were two African females aged 16, or aged 15 and 16, or aged 16 and 17 in a 
household in wave 5, both are excluded from the set of possible matches in wave 5. 
This is done to reduce the possibility of false matches, since we would not be able to 
                                                 
3 As stated in the official meta-data releases of Statistics South Africa. 
4 Statistics South Africa indicated that household identifiers were generally maintained across waves for 
revisited properties. For properties containing multiple dwellings, household identifiers were not necessarily 
maintained across waves.  5 
 
uniquely identify these observations based on their demographic characteristics in the 
corresponding wave t or t+1.  
Step 5: Remaining observations can potentially be matched across waves. We matched 
observations across wave t and wave t+1 using household identifier, gender, race and 
aget = aget+1, where the subscript on age denotes the corresponding wave. Perfectly 
matched observations are removed from the set and stored. 
Step 6: For remaining observations, we match again on household identifier, gender, race and 
aget + 1 = aget+1. This allows for an individual’s age to increase by one in the six 
months between waves. This second set of matches is also removed from the set and 
stored. 
Step 7: To allow for a small amount of misreporting of age, we matched the final remaining 
unmatched observations in the set of potential matches using household identifier, 
gender, race and aget - 1 = aget+1.  
Step 8: The matches in steps 5, 6 and 7 are appended to generate the full panel, which we 
refer to as the ‘expanded match’.  
Step 9: To test whether our results are sensitive to potentially false matches, we then imposed 
additional consistency requirements on the expanded matches. We excluded matches 
with aget - 1 = aget+1, or with educationt greater than educationt+1, or with a change in 
marital status from married, divorced or widowed in wave t to ‘never married’ in 
wave  t+1, or with an observed decrease in the person’s ability to read or write 
between waves. This subset is called the ‘strict match’ panel.  
 
To analyze transitions, each respondent aged 15 or older is classified into one of five 




“NEA”  : not economically active, = 1 is a person is not working, not looking for work, 
and not willing to accept a ‘reasonable’ offer, = 0 otherwise. 
“Unempl_d”  : discouraged unemployed, =1 if a person is not working, not looking for 
work, but is willing to accept a ‘reasonable’ offer, = 0 otherwise. 
“Unempl_s”  : searching unemployed, =1 if a person is not working, but is actively 
searching for work, = 0 otherwise. 
“Empl_inf”  : employed in the informal sector, =1 if a person is working, and reports that 
the employment takes place in the informal sector, = 0 otherwise. 
“Empl_for”  : employed in the formal sector, =1 if a person is working, and reports that the 
employment takes place in the formal sector, = 0 otherwise. 
 
3.2 Sample sizes 
 
We label each panel as “panelij” where ‘i’ and ‘j’ refer to the number corresponding to wave t 
and wave t+1 respectively. We thus have panel45, panel56, panel67 and panel78. Table 2 shows 
sample sizes. Our average match rate is approximately 52% using the expanded criteria and 
38% using the strict criteria.
6 The final pooled sample across the four waves is very large: 
117,553 observations using the strict criteria and 161,289 observations using the expanded 
criteria.  
 
                                                 
5 We made use of the classifications provided by Statistics South Africa here. The variables are called “status1”, 
“status2” and “sectorwk”. 
6 This compares reasonably well with the US Current Population Survey match rate obtained in Madrian and 
Lefgren (1999), which ranged between 71% and 65%. 6 
 
Table 2: Sample sizes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)=(5)/(3) (8)=(6)/(3)
Wave t Wave t+1 Wave t Wave t+1 Expanded Strict Expanded Strict
Panel 45 106,455 109,410 80,782 75,342 37,161 27,723 0.49 0.37
Panel 56 109,410 102,535 88,587 84,526 44,041 30,280 0.52 0.36
Panel 67 102,535 100,834 81,831 76,489 40,582 30,930 0.53 0.40
Panel 78 100,834 105,025 76,121 72,710 39,505 28,620 0.54 0.39
All Panels 419,234 417,804 327,321 309,067 161,289 117,553 0.52 0.38
Cross Section
# people in 
households common 
to both waves & not 
new to household
Number of individual 
matches





3.3 Issues arising with the match 
 
3.3.1 Non-random matching on observables 
The first potential pitfall from using this data is matches may not represent a random sample 
of the population. Table 3 provides summary statistics of our matched sample using the 
expanded criteria alongside the corresponding statistics from the related full cross-section. 
The match algorithm is systematically more likely to match females and non-Africans, 
individuals in urban areas, youth younger than 25 and the elderly aged 60 or above. Of those 
older than 15, we are more likely to match respondents who are ‘not economically active’ and 
less likely to match respondents in any other category. 
 
To the extent that attrition arises for observable reasons, we can correct for this by re-
weighting the matched sub-sample. For example, if shack dwellers are more likely to move 
and are thus less likely to be matched, we can adjust the weighting of those shack dwellers 
who we do manage to match. Thus, non-random matching on observables is not an 
insurmountable problem per se, as we can use inverse probability weighting (IPW) methods 
to obtain unbiased estimates (see Wooldridge 2001, pp 587-590). 
 
For each full cross section, we estimate probit regressions for the probability of being 
matched across waves and re-weight the matched sample using the (IPW) method. This was 
done for each of the ‘expanded matches’ and the ‘strict matches’.
7 Probit results were 
consistent with information in Table 3 telling us who is more likely to be matched. In 
addition, several other variables indicative of stability were significant predictors of the 
match probability. Married people, those with more education and those in smaller 
households are more likely to be matched. Respondents in different provinces had different 
propensities to be matched. Mud dwellings correlated negatively with the match rate, while 
dwellings made of brick correlated positively. Not surprisingly, home ownership is a strong 
predictor of match probability, with an even stronger relationship amongst those who owned 
their homes but did not yet have it fully paid off. 
8 
 
                                                 
7 These regressions included in the appendix at the end of the paper. 
8 Questions on home ownership, type of dwelling and quality of walls were only asked in waves 4, 6 and 8. We 
thus used the wave t+1 information for the wave t probit if necessary, by matching on households. We do not 
believe that this is problematic for the purpose of generating the weights. 7 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the panels in relative to the cross-sections
Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8 Panel 45 Panel 56 Panel 67 Panel 78
% male 47.3 47.7 47.8 47.6 47.7 46.3 46.4 46.2 46.5
% African 79.2 78.1 78.0 77.8 77.5 77.3 75.8 76.2 76.0
% Coloured 11.4 11.4 11.6 11.6 11.7 12.5 12.9 12.9 13.2
% Indian 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3 1.9
% White 7.3 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.5 7.8 8.9 8.5 9.0
% Urban 53.7 54.4 53.5 53.6 53.5 55.2 56.5 55.1 55.2
% Age < 25 53.6 52.7 53.3 53.1 52.6 55.2 54.8 54.3 54.8
% 24 < Age < 60 39.2 39.8 39.2 39.3 39.6 37.3 37.2 37.6 37.3
% 60 < Age 7.2 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.6 8.0 8.1 8.0
% NEA 37.5 35.4 38.1 37.7 38.2 40.6 39.3 40.8 40.6
% Unemp_D 10.5 10.3 9.8 9.9 11.7 9.9 9.7 9.4 9.0
% Unemp_S 15.1 15.8 15.4 16.0 13.6 14.1 15.0 14.5 15.1
% Empl_informal 11.6 12.5 10.8 10.5 10.3 10.8 11.0 9.7 9.6
% Empl_formal 25.3 25.9 25.9 25.9 26.2 24.7 25.1 25.6 25.8
Notes:
The statistics for the `wave' columns refer to the entire cross-section
The statistics for the `panel' columns refer to the matches using the expanded criteria
In the panel columns, the age and labour market status statistics refer to the percentages in wave t.
Proportions of each race do not necessarily add up to 1 as some respondents report their race as "other"
The labour market status statistics refer to people aged 15 and higher  
 
 
3.3.2 Non-random matching on unobservables 
A more difficult issue arises with non-random matching on unobservable characteristics. This 
is similar to a selective attrition problem in bona fide longitudinal samples. If these 
characteristics are orthogonal to variables used in any particular analysis, estimates will still 
be unbiased in expectation. Alternatively, if unobservable characteristics are reasonably 
proxied for by observable characteristics, then the IPW will correct for this. For example, 
suppose that starting to receive a pension is correlated with both migration and retirement, 
and that age-eligibility is a reasonable proxy for pension recipiency. If we cannot observe 
pension recipiency but include age-eligibility instead we could appropriately correct for this.  
 
For most analyses, however, it is likely that unobservable differences should matter.  People 
presumably do move in search of jobs, if they become unemployed, or if they find a job in a 
different area – hence, the type of people who are most likely to search for jobs are the ones 
most likely missing from the matched panel. It would be difficult to find reasonable proxies 
for `search type’ in remaining observables.  
 
In our study of labour market transitions, this non-random matching on unobservables affects 
how we interpret results. Assuming that a transition in labour market status is positively 
correlated with migration and that we have not corrected for this using the IPW technique our 
estimated transition probabilities are likely lower bounds of the true population level 
transition probabilities. In other words, the stability of individuals who are matched may lead 
us to over-estimate persistence. 
 
 
3.3.3 False Matches 
The third challenge arises as there are undoubtedly some false matches in our panel. If we 
reasonably believe that most people in a particular labour market state are likely to be in that 
same state six months later, than random false matching is likely to exaggerate our estimated 8 
 
transition probabilities.
9  For this reason, we constructed the two samples, using both the 
expanded criteria and strict criteria. If results to the same analyses using these two matching 
criteria differ significantly, then false matches are likely to be a big problem. If, however, 
similar results are obtained using both panels, then we can be more confident of the validity 
of our matching algorithm.  
 
Tables 4a and 4b contain mean transition rates for people aged 15 to 58 in wave t, for the 
matches using the expanded and strict criteria respectively. All four panels were pooled to 
generate these tables and all estimates are weighted using person weights released by 
Statistics South Africa
10, multiplied by the inverse of the match probability obtained from the 
probit regressions discussed above. 
 
The columns represent a person’s wave t status, and the rows a person’s wave t+1 status. 
Thus, the entry of 2.65 in the column labeled ‘NEA’ and in the row labeled ‘Empl_for’ in 
Table 4a, indicates that 2.65% of the not economically active population aged 15 to 58 were 
employed in the formal sector six months later. 
 
Table 4c presents differences between these estimates. In general, results are fairly consistent. 
Of the 25 entries, 3 entries have an absolute difference of greater than 1 % point, with the 
largest difference of 1.47 % points in the proportion of not economically active remaining not 
economically active. On the other hand, 15 of the 25 entries have an absolute value of less 
than 0.5 % points. On aggregate, we find this outcome reassuring. False matches could well 
be a problem, but their magnitude is unlikely to be sufficient to completely invalidate our 
results
11. 
                                                 
9 Ashenfelter, Deaton and Solon (1986) argue that this “may not matter very much since there is likely to be a 
positive correlation between the behavior of different households in similar (in this case, identical) 
accommodations.”  
10 We used the person weight in wave t as the relevant person weight. 
11 To be more correct, false matches that are excluded by the difference between the strict and expanded 
matching criteria are unlikely to bias our estimates significantly. False matches that are common to both will 
continue to bias both sets of estimates. 9 
 
Table 4a 
Transition rates (%) across labour market states from panel: expanded match
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
Numbers 30,880 9,959 15,476 9,620 25,705
NEA 75.69 19.68 12.63 12.55 2.92
Unempl_d 8.8 36.56 19.57 10.57 2.33
Unempl_s 8.56 29.39 48.13 13.72 6.12
Empl_inf 4.29 9.58 9.46 48.71 5.38
Empl_for 2.65 4.78 10.21 14.44 83.25
100 100 100 100 100
Table 4b 
Transition rates (%) across labour market states from panel: strict match 
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
Numbers 22,738 6,529 10,173 6,004 17,187
NEA 77.16 19.4 12.08 12.88 2.64
Unempl_d 8.41 36.58 19.26 10.59 1.94
Unempl_s 8.01 29.47 49.19 13.26 5.55
Empl_inf 3.89 9.47 8.78 48.12 4.79
Empl_for 2.53 5.08 10.68 15.14 85.08
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Table 4c 
Difference in transition rates between expanded and strict matches
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
NEA -1.47 0.28 0.55 -0.33 0.28
Unempl_d 0.39 -0.02 0.31 -0.02 0.39
Unempl_s 0.55 -0.08 -1.06 0.46 0.57
Empl_inf 0.4 0.11 0.68 0.59 0.59










3.3.4 A Robustness Check 
A further robustness check is suggested by Wittenberg (2002): “The equilibrium stocks can 
be deduced from the various flow rates”. If our estimates are sensible, we can take the wave t 
levels for the entire cross section, combine these with our estimated transition rates between 
wave t and wave t+1, and predict the wave t+1 levels. If these predictions are very different 
from the observed levels in the wave t+1 cross-section, then we are likely to have 
systematically biased estimates. This is only a weak test, since we could have simultaneously 
biased but offsetting estimates that could still generate the correct predicted levels. 
Nevertheless, the test does provide us with at least one mechanism by which we can 
challenge the credibility of our estimates.  10 
 
 
Formally, we have Xt+1 = At . Xt , where Xt is a 5 x 1 vector containing the proportion of the 
population in each labour market state at time t, X t+1 is defined in similar fashion, and At is a 
5 x 5 transition matrix as specified above. Our transition matrices above are estimates, 
denoted by Ât. Assuming that the cross-sectional estimates generate unbiased estimates of the 
true population levels, we calculate the predicted levels using Ât  and Xt from the cross 
section, denoted by Xt, CS. We then calculate the difference between the predicted proportions 
and observed proportions in the full cross-section in wave t+1 (denoted by Xt+1, CS), and 
investigate the magnitude of these differences. This vector of differences is denoted Dt+1. 
Thus: 
 
Dt+1 = Ât. Xt, CS - Xt+1, CS 
 
This exercise is performed for each wave separately. The differences between the proportions 
in the full cross section, and the predicted proportions in each labour market state are 
presented in Table 5:  
 
Table 5: Differences between predicted and cross-sectional percentages (in percentage points)
Wave 45 Wave 56 Wave 67 Wave 78 Wave 45 Wave 56 Wave 67 Wave 78 Strict Expanded
NEA -1.02 -0.48 -0.86 -0.21 -1.06 -0.47 -0.77 0.05 -0.64 -0.56
u n e m p l _ D - 0 . 4 90 . 4 60 . 9 32 . 0 60 . 4 40 . 4 30 . 7 12 . 2 60 . 7 40 . 9 6
unempl_S 1.78 -0.07 0.14 -2.70 1.43 0.27 0.21 -2.61 -0.21 -0.18
empl_inf -0.53 -0.71 -0.77 -0.40 -0.32 -0.41 -0.22 -0.10 -0.60 -0.26
empl_for 0.25 0.78 0.57 1.25 -0.49 0.16 0.06 0.41 0.71 0.03
Total 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Note:
With inverse probability reweighting
The totals column is not exactly zero due to rounding errors at various stages of the calculations
Strict Match Expanded Match Ave: all_waves
 
 
On the whole, differences are not large. With the exception of a few categories in panel78, the 
difference is less than 2 % points. On average, across the four panels, the difference is less 
than 1% point for each category, regardless of which set of matched observations we use. 
These seem to be reasonable ‘ballpark’ estimates of true transition rates. Since the expanded 
match criteria do not yield strikingly different results and has many more observations, we 
use this dataset for the remainder of the paper. 
 
 
4. Transition rates 
 
We are primarily interested in describing the rates at which people find jobs, lose jobs, and 
enter and leave the labour force. We first discuss the aggregate transition rates, and then 
investigate how these differ by various demographically sub-populations, defined by age, 
race and gender. The four panels are pooled for this component of the analysis.  
 
4.1 Aggregate transitions 
Aggregate transitions in Table 4a clearly indicate some degree of persistence in the labour 
market, since any individual in a given state in wave t is most likely to still be in that state in 
wave t+1. However, there is also lots of movement across states. Roughly one quarter of 
individuals NEA in wave t enter the labour force by t+1, although less than one third of these 
find employment of any sort. Of the discouraged unemployed, almost 20% leave the labour 
market, while about 30% are actively searching for jobs. Approximately 1 in 7 finds 
employment, although two thirds of the jobs are in the informal sector. In contrast, searching 
unemployed are more likely to find employment (approximately 1 in 5 find employment), but 11 
 
the differential is almost entirely generated by a greater rate of finding formal sector jobs. 
Thus, the payoff to searching is likely to manifest not only in terms of the probability of 
finding a job, but also in the quality of the job.  
 
We also observe that searching unemployed are less likely to be discouraged, or leave the 
labour force, than the non-searching unemployed.  Turning now to those employed in the 
informal sector, just over 1 in 3 are not employed six months later. Informal sector 
employment does not entail much job security. Of particular interest is the percentage of 
informal sector employees who find formal sector employment in wave t+1. At 14.44 %, this 
is greater than the proportion of either group of the unemployed. This is consistent with an 
hypothesis whereby skills, networks and information obtained during informal sector 
employment actually assist workers in subsequently obtaining formal sector employment. 
Such a possibility has not yet been investigated in the South African literature.  
 
4.2 Racial differences in adult transition rates 
We next perform the same analysis for African, Coloured and White adults separately. 
Indians were excluded due to relatively small sample sizes. Adults are aged 25 to 58 in wave 
t inclusive. The lower bound of 25 is imposed to exclude individuals still in school. The 
upper bound is imposed because of labour force participation around retirement age. 
Ranchhod (2006) argues that labour force participation rates of females exhibit a sharp 
discontinuity at age 60 due to the person potentially becoming eligible to receive the old age 
pension. We wanted to exclude such observations as they would exaggerate our transition 
probabilities. Some respondents aged 59 in wave t turn 60 by wave t+1, so we imposed a 
cutoff at age 58. Results are presented in Table 6a, 6b and 6c below. 
 
Results for each race group are qualitatively similar to the aggregate findings. Searchers are 
more likely to find employment relative to the non-searching unemployed, and those 
employed in informal sector jobs are more likely to find formal sector work than the 
searching unemployed. Those with jobs are also less likely to become not economically 





Transition rates : African Adults
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
Numbers 6,396 5,676 9,142 7,265 13,117
NEA 55.22 16.74 9.73 9.84 1.99
Unempl_d 15.87 36.76 20.05 10.54 2.6
Unempl_s 13.67 29.56 48.76 13.43 7.01
Empl_inf 11.29 12.31 11.98 53.55 7.03
Empl_for 3.95 4.64 9.47 12.64 81.37
100 100 100 100 100
Table 6b 
Transition rates : Coloured Adults
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
Numbers 1,830 489 991 800 4,321
NEA 71.41 24.96 16.28 10.07 2.64
Unempl_d 7.36 20.36 11.26 3.9 1.61
Unempl_s 10.43 32.7 43.1 13.06 4.44
Empl_inf 5.35 7.28 8.54 50.79 3.26
Empl_for 5.45 14.7 20.81 22.18 88.05
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Table 6c 
Transition rates : White Adults
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
Numbers 1,234 157 213 323 4,944
NEA 71.28 45.89 27.07 14.91 3.83
Unempl_d 6.84 19.08 12.35 1.61 0.66
Unempl_s 3.38 9.72 24.96 4.73 1.47
Empl_inf 4 6.46 6.38 23.28 3.22
Empl_for 14.5 18.85 29.25 55.47 90.83









The pattern that emerges across race groups is remarkable. In each of the five states in wave 
t, Whites are more likely to find or keep employment than Coloureds, who in turn are 
generally more likely to find or keep employment than Africans.
12 Of the searching 
unemployed, more than 1 in 3 whites find employment, predominantly in the formal sector 
(82%)
13, while slightly less than 1 in 3 Coloureds find employment, with 71% of these jobs in 
the formal sector. In contrast, less than 1 in 4 African searchers find employment, with less 
than half of the newfound employment in the formal sector (44%). A similar pattern holds in 
                                                 
12 The one exception being not economically active Coloureds, who are more likely to find formal sector jobs 
than their African counterparts, but are less likely to find some type of employment. The difference occurs as 
Africans in this category are more than twice as likely to find informal sector employment than Coloureds. 
13 Obtained by 29.25/(29.25+6.38) 13 
 
reverse if we look at the probability that an individual of a particular race group in a given 
state in wave t is classified as unemployed in wave t+1.  
 
The rates at which the different race groups leave the labour force conditional on being 
unemployed in wave t also tell an interesting story. Of the discouraged unemployed, 45.89% 
of whites leave the labour force, while 24.96% of Coloureds and only 16.74 % of Africans 
leave. Of the searching unemployed, over 1 in 4 whites leave the labour force, while less than 
1 in 10 Africans do so. This is unlikely to be a reflection of discrimination in the labour 
market, as whites are more likely to find employment when they are unemployed. A plausible 
explanation is that whites have a greater asset base, or access to greater familial resources, 
which allows them to withdraw at a faster rate. Thus, at least part of the racial differentials in 
levels of unemployment reflects the greater rates at which the unemployed whites leave the 
labour force.   
 
 
4.3 Racial differences in youth transitions 
 
Youth are defined as individuals aged 15 to 24 inclusive in wave t. Here, we are primarily 
interested in the success rates in finding employment of first time entrants in the labour 
market. Amongst youth within a racial group, we note the familiar pattern that those who are 
not economically active are the least likely to be employed in wave t+1, followed in 
ascending order by the discouraged unemployed, the searching unemployed, the informal 
sector workers, and the formal sector workers (see Table 7 a-c). However, informal sector 
African youth are in fact more likely to leave the labour force than the unemployed African 
youth.
14   
 
Comparing across races, Africans are again least likely to keep a formal sector job, or to find 
one within a 6 month period. Amongst African youth in a formal sector job in wave t, 2 in 5 
are no longer employed as such in wave t+1. Corresponding numbers for Coloured and 
whites are approximately 1 in 4 and 1 in 5 respectively. 
 
Entry into the labour force is also marked by large racial differences. While the rate at which 
African and white youth enter the labour market
15 is approximately equal, African youth are 
far less successful in finding employment.   
 
                                                 
14 We do not comment on the unemployed white youth, nor on the informal sector white and Coloured youth, as 
our sample sizes in these categories in wave t are rather small.  
15 As measured by the proportion of those who transit out of the NEA category between the two waves. 14 
 
Table 7a 
Transition rates : African Youth
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
Numbers 17,393 3,099 3,883 979 819
NEA 83.52 22.78 16.87 30.91 7.2
Unempl_d 7.15 40.44 22.33 16.87 10.14
Unempl_s 6.65 28.76 49.73 18.63 18.97
Empl_inf 2.15 5.81 5.35 27.37 4.65
Empl_for 0.53 2.21 5.71 6.22 59.04
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Table 7b 
Transition rates : Coloured Youth
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
Numbers 1,723 386 842 118 872
NEA 77.58 17.64 12.68 6.81 4.22
Unempl_d 5.65 25.7 16.36 20.27 4.65
Unempl_s 12.19 40.41 51.43 14.7 14.56
Empl_inf 0.76 3.07 2.73 23.64 2.63
Empl_for 3.82 13.18 16.8 34.58 73.94
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Table 7c 
Transition rates : White Youth
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
Numbers 1,085 47 99 30 422
NEA 84.92 36.96 24.38 24.39 8.32
Unempl_d 2.28 14.81 3.38 0 2.51
Unempl_s 4.64 18.76 26.17 13.05 5.7
Empl_inf 0.39 0 3.62 7.6 1.67
Empl_for 7.77 29.47 42.45 54.96 81.81










The following proportions are striking, but should be interpreted with the caveat that for 
Coloured and whites they are estimated using only a couple of hundred observations. 
Nevertheless, of African youth who enter the labour market, 43% are ‘discouraged’, while 
another 40% are actively searching. Only 3.2% find formal sector employment. For Coloured 
entrants, 25% are discouraged, 54% are actively searching, while 17% have found formal 
employment. Even among whites, who experience by far the most positive entry into the 
labour market, only 51.5% have found formal sector jobs, while 15% are ‘discouraged’ and 
30.7% are actively searching. 
Finally, we compare transition rates between unemployed Coloureds and Africans. In each of 
these categories, Coloureds are more likely to find employment, and much more likely to find 15 
 
formal sector employment. In sum, being young and entering the job market is likely to entail 
a lot of disappointment, regardless of race. This is especially true for young Africans. 
 
 
4.4 Gender differences between African adults 
 
Employment levels and sectors differ by gender, so it is reasonable to expect transition rates 
to differ as well. We restrict attention to Africans for brevity. Results are presented in Tables 
8a and 8b. 
 
Table 8a 
Transition rates : African Adults Male
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
Numbers 1,867 1,724 3,954 2,471 7,758
NEA 60.56 11.61 8.15 6.27 1.46
Unempl_d 11.37 32.33 16.44 9.3 2.35
Unempl_s 13.78 36.49 50.82 16.17 6.98
Empl_inf 8.72 12.54 11.83 47.33 6.81
Empl_for 5.57 7.03 12.76 20.93 82.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Table 8b 
Transition rates : African Adults Female
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
Numbers 4,529 3,952 5,188 4,794 5,359
NEA 52.9 19.2 11 11.85 2.83
Unempl_d 17.83 38.89 22.94 11.23 3.01
Unempl_s 13.62 26.23 47.11 11.89 7.05
Empl_inf 12.41 12.19 12.11 57.05 7.39
Empl_for 3.24 3.49 6.84 7.98 79.71








Within groups, there is a fair amount of persistence. Informal sector workers are more likely 
to find formal sector employment than the unemployed. Of those not employed in wave t, 
searchers are the most likely to find employment. Amongst men, the discouraged 
unemployed are more likely to find employment than the not economically active, but this 
difference in likelihood is approximately zero for women. For the most part, the transition 
rates within group are qualitatively similar to the aggregate transition rates. 
 
Between groups, there are important differences. Unemployed males in either category are 
more likely to find employment than their female counterparts, while employed males are 
more likely to remain employed. Females who are in the labour force in a particular state are 
more likely to leave than males in the same state. In addition, males employed in the informal 
sector are much more likely to enter formal employment than informal sector female workers. 
At the same time, females in the informal sector are much more likely to remain in the 
informal sector.  16 
 
 
There is a strong and systematic difference in the composition of employment, with women 
considerably more likely to find and keep informal sector employment. Of men who enter the 
labour force, 22.1% find informal sector employment, while another 14.1% find formal sector 
employment. For women, the corresponding numbers are 26.3% and 6.9%. Thus, while not 
economically active women are more likely to enter the labour force, they are less likely to 
find employment. Moreover, of those women who find employment, almost 80% find 
employment in the informal sector, as compared to 61% of men. Regardless of initial state, 
African females are more likely to be employed in the informal sector than in the formal 
sector, relative to males in the same initial state. 
 
This is remarkably consistent with the findings of Casale and Posel (2002), who found the 
identical changes in the levels in each state in the period from 1995 to 1999. Part of   
male/female difference undoubtedly arises from the importance of informal sector domestic 
work in South Africa which is predominantly female. However, greater access to informal 
sector employment would not necessarily explain why a smaller proportion of females, 
conditional only on their wave t state, find formal sector employment than males.  
 
 4.5 Difference between African youths by gender  
 
Finally, we investigate gender differences for African youth in Tables 9a and 9b. Patterns are 
broadly consistent with the prior results. One point of departure is that over 30% of both male 
and female informal sector workers are likely to withdraw completely from the labour force. 
One possibility is that such workers are doing so to continue their studies, which could well 
be justified given the poor employment probabilities they experience. Unlike earlier 
subpopulations considered, African female youth are more likely to transit into a formal 
sector job directly from searching unemployment than from informal sector employment. 
 
The formal – informal sector differences are no longer clear cut. Females are more likely to 
keep a formal sector job, but unemployed and informally employed females are still less 
likely to find one. Females are more likely to enter the labour force than males. Of those who 
enter the labour force, both genders find formal sector employment at approximately the 
same rate (3.217% vs. 3.200%)
16, but males are considerably less likely to find informal 
sector employment (9.65% vs. 17.1%). The remainder become unemployed. Of those who 
were unemployed in wave t, females are more likely to still be unemployed, and less likely to 
find employment. The finding here is that the employment prospects are exceptionally bleak 
for both demographic groups. Less than 1 in 10 females and 1 in 8 males who are actively 
searching for employment are employed six months later. 
 
                                                 
16 3.217% = 0.47/(100-85.31), 3.200%=0.59/(100-81.66) 17 
 
Table 9a 
Transition rates : African Youth Male
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
Numbers 8,670 1,180 1,805 547 495
NEA 85.31 22.12 16.62 30.28 6.97
Unempl_d 5.7 36.68 21.55 15.86 10.18
Unempl_s 6.01 30.37 49.36 18.88 21
Empl_inf 2.52 7.36 6.18 27.02 5.28
Empl_for 0.47 3.48 6.28 7.96 56.57
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Table 9b 
Transition rates : African Youth Female
NEA Unempl_d Unempl_s Empl_inf Empl_for
Numbers 8,723 1,919 2,078 432 324
NEA 81.66 23.22 17.1 31.74 7.6
Unempl_d 8.66 42.88 23.02 18.21 10.07
Unempl_s 7.32 27.72 50.06 18.3 15.57
Empl_inf 1.77 4.8 4.62 27.84 3.6
Empl_for 0.59 1.39 5.2 3.91 63.17










Our primary aim in this paper was to draw attention to a data resource that could prove useful 
to researchers interested in the South African labour market. We described in detail one 
possible way in which longitudinal data could be matched across five waves of the Labour 
Force Surveys. We then performed some analyses to probe the data quality in our matched 
panels. While the resulting data is far from perfect, we believe it is sufficiently accurate to be 
useful in analysis of labour market transitions. Moreover, the current lack of alternative 
longitudinal datasets that cover the entire country enhances the value of such a resource. In 
the future, we look forward to nationally representative panel data that will emerge from the 
National Income Dynamics Study. 
 
The second contribution of this paper was to estimate transition rates across various labour 
market states in South Africa. These transition rates should be interpreted with some caution. 
We did not test for statistically significant differences between groups, nor control for other 
covariates. In particular, we did not control for any year- or season-specific labour market 
shocks. In some cases, transition rate estimates are likely to be much less accurate due to 
small sample sizes.  
 
Bearing in mind that transition rates off diagonal are probably underestimating movement in 
the labour market, we learn that transitions from informal sector employment into formal 
sector work across a 6 month period are almost uniformly and substantially higher for all 
groups than transitions into formal jobs from other states. Whether this is a reflection of type 
(the types who get informal jobs are motivated to move on to formal jobs) or of opportunity 18 
 
(getting an informal job is a stepping stone to a formal work relationship) is not something 
we can test in these data. Africans have far lower rates of movement into formal sector work 
than other race groups at all ages and women are most likely to find an informal sector job, if 
at all. We believe our paper takes a useful step forward in understanding South African 
labour market dynamics. In addition, the matched panel we have been able to create 
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Appendix Table: Probit coefficients (marginal effects) for probability of match
Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7
Unempl_d -0.042 -0.036 -0.034 -0.058 -0.044 -0.032 -0.051 -0.043
[0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
Unempl_s -0.037 -0.036 -0.039 -0.049 -0.038 -0.026 -0.053 -0.032
[0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Empl_informal -0.033 -0.028 -0.035 -0.038 -0.048 -0.026 -0.051 -0.038
[0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
Empl_formal -0.036 -0.025 -0.032 -0.045 -0.027 -0.017 -0.037 -0.023
[0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
pensionable age -0.033 0.016 0.02 -0.018 -0.013 0.016 0.023 -0.016
[0.013]* [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013]
Age -0.011 -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Age < 20 0.048 0.064 0.04 0.063 0.068 0.066 0.077 0.063
[0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]**
Age squared 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]**
Age cubed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]**
Coloured 0.075 0.069 1 0.087 0.069 0.069 0.964 0.091
[0.008]** [0.007]** [0.000]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.031]** [0.008]**
Indian 0.065 0.052 0.077 -0.033 0.084 0.039 0.071 -0.014
[0.013]** [0.012]** [0.008]** [0.013]* [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.008]** [0.013]
White 0.065 0.046 0.031 0.048 0.099 0.082 0.054 0.089
[0.008]** [0.008]** [0.013]* [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.013]** [0.008]**
Race_other -0.402 -0.45 0.072 -0.3 -0.296 0.105
[0.023]** [0.024]** [0.008]** [0.020]** [0.023]** [0.008]**
male -0.012 -0.02 -0.026 -0.021 -0.016 -0.018 -0.027 -0.026
[0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.004]**
urban 0.038 0.025 0.021 0.016 0.031 0.019 0.017 0.015
[0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.005]**
province==2 0.008 -0.01 -0.047 -0.058 0.008 0.002 -0.035 -0.058
[0.009] [0.008] [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]** [0.008]**
province==3 -0.021 -0.046 -0.066 -0.111 -0.029 -0.038 -0.069 -0.091
[0.010]* [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
province==4 0.017 0.026 -0.023 -0.011 0.009 0.014 -0.029 -0.025
[0.010] [0.010]** [0.010]* [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009]** [0.010]*
province==5 -0.081 -0.08 -0.111 -0.16 -0.072 -0.057 -0.098 -0.13
[0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
province==6 0.069 0.035 0.01 -0.024 0.057 0.028 0.011 -0.022
[0.010]** [0.009]** [0.010] [0.010]* [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009] [0.009]*
province==7 -0.074 -0.053 -0.068 -0.071 -0.065 -0.06 -0.068 -0.078
[0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
province==8 0.03 0.008 -0.017 -0.011 0.015 0.001 -0.03 -0.006
[0.010]** [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]** [0.009]
province==9 0.043 0.032 0.013 0.007 0.034 0.037 0.025 0.016
[0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009] [0.010] [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]
Widowed -0.011 -0.025 -0.017 -0.012 -0.021 -0.036 -0.032 -0.021
[0.010] [0.009]** [0.010] [0.010] [0.009]* [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.010]*
Divorced -0.022 -0.068 -0.045 -0.051 -0.074 -0.091 -0.083 -0.082
[0.013] [0.012]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.010]** [0.012]** [0.012]**
Never Married -0.055 -0.054 -0.053 -0.056 -0.017 -0.023 -0.012 -0.012
[0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]* [0.006]
Marital_unknown 0.038 -0.417 0.299 -0.283 0.191 -0.246 0.305 -0.181
[0.220] [0.082]** [0.180] [0.120]* [0.222] [0.089]** [0.201] [0.115]
hhsize -0.008 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 -0.008 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Dwelling_owned + paid off 0.103 0.162 0.126 0.157 0.101 0.136 0.113 0.132
[0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.008]**
Dwelling_owned + not paid off 0.137 0.186 0.153 0.189 0.137 0.174 0.144 0.172
[0.009]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.011]**
renting 0.002 0.019 0.032 0.05 0.029 0.035 0.041 0.049
[0.008] [0.008]* [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.010]**
wall_brick 0.008 0.053 0.025 0.031 0.009 0.042 0.035 0.033
[0.008] [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.008] [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.009]**
wall_cement 0.013 0.071 0.037 0.038 0.004 0.057 0.049 0.04
[0.009] [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.008] [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.009]**
wall_iron 0.021 0.046 0.04 0.032 0.019 0.059 0.026 0.03
[0.011] [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.011]** [0.010] [0.010]** [0.010]* [0.011]**
house_shack -0.037 -0.066 -0.062 -0.079 -0.034 -0.063 -0.048 -0.059
[0.010]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.010]**
house_other -0.041 -0.058 -0.058 -0.083 -0.033 -0.038 -0.049 -0.063
[0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
house_hut -0.009 -0.001 -0.008 0.015 -0.019 -0.015 -0.01 0.011
[0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008]* [0.008]* [0.008] [0.009]
education_unknown 0.001 0.02 -0.011 0.009 -0.102 -0.055 -0.109 -0.129
[0.016] [0.017] [0.018] [0.019] [0.013]** [0.015]** [0.016]** [0.016]**
years of education 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.002 -0.002
[0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001] [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]*
matric -0.013 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 0.009 0.006 0.025 0.059
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]** [0.007]**
can read 0.041 -0.006 0.075 0.021 -0.028 -0.089 -0.015 0.01
[0.024] [0.027] [0.029]** [0.031] [0.024] [0.027]** [0.029] [0.030]
can write -0.017 0.034 -0.052 0.012 -0.007 -0.034 -0.036 0
[0.024] [0.026] [0.029] [0.031] [0.023] [0.026] [0.028] [0.030]
Observations 80688 88486 81729 76042 80688 88486 81729 76042
Matched Expanded Criteria Matched Strict Criteria22 
 
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Notes:
Race_other was dropped from the wave 7 regressions as it predicted failure perfectly.
Age missing was similarly dropped.
Omitted categories:
Labour market status: Not economically active
Race: African
Provinces: Western Cape
Marital status: Married / Living together as husband/wife
Dwelling ownership: Rent free accomodation
Wall_type: Mud walls
House type: Brick
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